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ABSTRACT

This Article examines the role of unbridled executive pay in exacerbating
what Keynes called the "animal spirits" of the market. It analyzes the ways in
which theoretical bases of executive pay structures diverge from reality, and
the stakes for the firm and society in skyrocketing pay practices unlinked to
Various regulatory efforts, including the executive pay
performance.
the
Dodd-Frank Act, are intended to better align pay with
of
provisions
performance. This article discusses these provisions and analyzes them in
light of behavioral economics. Curbing executive pay is vital to controlling
risk and preventing economic collapse, but the dynamics of group behavior
make solutions to the problem complex. This article acknowledges the
complexity of interconnected financial systems, and concludes that the
solution lies in a combination of removing perverse incentives in the tax
system, encouraging the use of deferred compensation, and legal reform,
together with increased vigilance on the part of regulators regarding the
interconnectedness of our economy.
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I. ONGOING FINANCIAL CRISIS
A. Stagnant Wages and Sky-rocketing Executive Compensation

A

the
been stagnant for decades. Over
wages have
workers'
MERICAN
pay in large, publicly held corporations has
executive
same time period,
skyrocketed. Executive compensation in the United States has now reached
well over 500 times that of hourly workers.' Excessive pay levels can affect
not only shareholder wealth, by decreasing dividends and reducing earnings
per share, it can also affect profitability by decreasing employee morale. 2 This
huge disparity in pay levels between top executives and labor is not replicated
in other industrialized nations; executive pay in Germany, for example,
averages only eleven times that of workers'. 3 It is not the disparity in pay
alone that is so disturbing-movie stars and athletes also garner huge
paychecks-but the disconnect between firm performance and executive
pay. 4 During the financial crisis, many of the firms with highly compensated
executives were not only failing to perform, but were also either the recipients
of taxpayer bailout funds from the Troubled Asset Relief Program ("TARP")
or the indirect beneficiaries of the bailout. Thus, the same wage-earners
whose incomes had been stagnant for decades were called upon to rescue the
profligate management of the "too-big-to-fail firms" that received their tax
dollars. Somehow that seems, at the very least, unfair.
It also seems remarkably short-sighted. As Michael Lewis's thoughtful
and entertaining book about the financial crisis The Big Short makes clear, this

1.

2.
3.

4.

See, eg., CEOs and their Indian Rope Tn>, ECoNOmisT, Dec. 11, 2004, at 61 (estimating the
pay differential between CEOs and workers to be a factor of 500 in 2003); Carola
Frydman & Raven Saks, Executive Compensation: A New View From a Long-Term Perspective,
1936-2005, FED. Rus. BD. TECH. REP. No. 2007-35 (2007), available at
http://federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2007/200735/200735abs.html (growth of CEO pay
relative to worker pay increased from 30:1 in 1970 to 120:1 by 2000).
Omari S. Simmons, Taking the Blue Pill: The Imponderable Impact of Executive Compensation
Reform, 62 S.M.U. L. Ruv. 299, 335 (2009).
Trevor Buck & Azura Shahrim, The Translation of Corporate Governance Changes Acrmss
Cultures: The Case of Germany, 36 J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 42, 48 (2005). There are signs,
however, that with the large multinationals, EU firms may be heading in the U.S.
direction. See, e.g., L. Reed Walton, U.K Pay Plans CridciZed, RISKMETRICS (Apr. 28, 2008,
11:47 AM), http://blog.riskmetrics.com/2008/04/001159print.html (noting opposition
to executive pay practices at BP, GlaxoSmithKline and HSBC).
See, e.g., Eric Dash, Federal Report Faults Banks on Huge Bonuses, N.Y. TIMES,July 23, 2010
(noting that "the federal authority on banker pay says that nearly 80% [of bonus pay doled
out in 2008] was unmerited'D.

104

Virginia Law & Business Review

6:101 (2011)

imbalance has consequences. 5 Among these consequences are a decreasing
middle class and an increasing divide between rich and poor.6 Unable to
maintain their standard of living (or pay for their homes, cars, and health
care), and encouraged by easily obtained loans, Americans went into massive
amounts of debt in the first decade of the twenty-first century, aided and
abetted by policies-governmental and private-enabling such massive
borrowing and engendering the subprime mortgage crisis from which we
have yet to emerge.
Neither the financial crisis nor the government bailout halted the
enormous executive pay packages. The departures of Stanley O'Neal from
Merrill Lynch and Charles Prince from Citigroup with munificent separation
packages (including the vesting of equity grants) are more emblematic of pay
for failure than of pay for performance. 7 After recognizing that its CEO,
Kenneth Lewis, missed performance goals in 2007, Bank of America cut his
bonus to $8.5 million from the target bonus of $18.5 million. 8 That hardly
seems like pay for performance. At Morgan Stanley, the CEO did not get a
bonus, but the firm's overall compensation and benefits expenses rose 18% in
2007 despite a 6% decrease in revenue. 9 On the eve of its governmentsponsored (and funded) takeover by Bank of America, Merrill Lynch's board
awarded $3.6 billion in incentive bonuses.' 0 Citi paid $5.33 billion in bonuses
in 2008, despite losing $27.7 billion and receiving $45 billion in the bailout."
Bank of America, recipient of $45 billion from TARP, paid out $3.3 billion in
bonuses.12 These examples are merely the most salient of a widespread

5.
6.

7.

8.

9.
10.

11.
12.

MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE (2010).
See, e.g., JEFFREY D. SACHS, COMMON WEALTH: ECONOMICS FOR A CROWDED PLANET

261-262 (2008) (presenting demographic data on the divide between rich and poor).
Despite the tanking of their firms, Price left Citigroup with about $29.5 million, and
O'Neal (whose departure from Merrill was deemed retirement) left with $36.8 million in
immediately vesting options, $25 million in retirement benefits, and $5 million in deferred
compensation. Bimal Patel, Credit Crisis and Corporate Governance Irplcations: Guidancefor
2008),
(Apr.
Best Practices, RISKMETRICs
Proxy Season and Insight into
http://www.riskmetrics.com/system/files/private/CreditCrisisCorporateGovernance200
80408.pdf.
Peter Edmonston, Major Bank Cuts Bonuses of Execuives, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 20, 2008, at C2.
This figure does not include his $1.5 million base salary, or $3 million in options awards.
Id.
Morgan Board Loses Support, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 5, 2008, at C8.
Judge Rejects Settlement Over Merrill Bonuses, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Sept. 14, 2009, 12:33
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/09/14/judge-rejects-setdement-over-merrillPM),
bonuses.
Editorial, Troubled Banks Huge Bonuses, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 3, 2009, at A20.
Id.
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phenomenon: when a firm does well, its executives are rewarded handsomely;
when the firm does poorly, the executives still make out very well.
The threat of financial regulation at last appears to have gotten the
attention of corporate boards. In the past year, many firms, especially those
that received government bailout funds, have cut executive pay. They were
undoubtedly responding to interim TARP rules mandating a $500,000 salary
cap on the largest TARP recipients (with additional pay in long-term
restricted stock),' as well as to public outcry and political pressure. They may
also have been responding to the Securities and Exchange Commission's
increased disclosure requirements relating to executive compensation,14 and
the new Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act's
("Dodd-Frank") provisions requiring public corporations to give their
shareholders a "say-on-pay" in the form of nonbinding recommendations to
the board.' 5
The result has been somewhat mixed and it is too early to say whether
the trend will continue. A survey of 200 top executives in large corporations
revealed that the median CEO pay package declined by 13% to $7.7 million in
2010, and the average pay decreased by 15% to $9.5 million.16 This sent pay
levels back to their 2004 levels, according to the study.' 7 The 2004 levels,
however, were (and are) still wildly disproportionate to what hourly workers
were making.
Moreover, this trend may be short-lived. Unless regulators are willing to
give teeth to their pronouncements, these reductions in executive pay may
become merely a temporary sop to public opinion. What is at stake is not just
the survival of and well-being of individual firms, but, with increasingly large,
interconnected firms, the health of the economy. This Article sets out the
problem of systemic risk, and the danger posed by failing to link pay to
performance in large corporations, especially those deemed "too big to fail."

Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 111(b)(2), 122
Stat. 3765, 3776-77 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5221) (setting standards for executive
compensation and corporate governance for firms that sell troubled assets to the
government under the Act). See also Devin Leonard, Executive Pay: A Special Report Bargain Ratesfor a CEO.?, N.Y. TiMlis, Apr. 3, 2010, at Bi.
14. See infra notes 153-165 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 148-150 and accompanying text.
16. Leonard, supra note 13, at B7 (describing a study conducted by Equilar, a compensation
research firm, of corporations with revenue of at least $5.78 billion that had filed their
proxy statements by March 26, 2010).
17. Id.
13.
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Part I examines the theoretical basis of executive pay structures, and
discusses the ways in which theory and reality diverge. It then examines the
stakes for the firm and society in skyrocketing pay practices unlinked to
performance in Part II. Part III discusses board dynamics in the context of
setting executive pay. Various regulatory efforts intended to better align pay
with performance, including the executive pay provisions of the Dodd-Frank,
are outlined in Part IV. Part V proposes and analyzes the most promising
solutions to the problem. In Part VI, the Article concludes that curbing
executive pay is vital to controlling risk and preventing economic collapse,
but solutions to the problem are complex, and suggests a combination of
removing perverse incentives in the tax system, encouraging the use of
deferred compensation, and legal reform, together with increased vigilance on
the part of regulators regarding the interconnectedness of our economy.
B. The Theories of Pay for Performance and Optimal Contracting
Two primary justifications are given by corporate boards for awarding
huge executive pay packages. The first is that CEOs are being paid for
performance, and that their pay packages act as an incentive to increase
shareholder wealth.18 Linking pay to performance is a way to motivate
executives to take risks that they might otherwise be inclined to avoid.' 9
Incentive pay is also believed to be essential to keep employees with
significant discretion from shirking.20
The second justification for the high rate of executive pay is that CEOs
are worth it: they must be highly paid in order to attract and retain their
talent.21 Stephen Bainbridge, for example, notes that film and athletic stars

See Eduardo Porter, More than Ever, It Pays to be the Top Executive, N.Y. TIMES, May 25,
2007, at Al (noting the claim that giving the top executive stock options links pay to
performance and comparing the CEO to an entertainment superstar). See also John E.
Core & Wayne R. Guay, Is There a Case for Regulating Executive Pay in the Financial
Services Industry? 3-4 Gan. 25, 2010) (working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1544104 (arguing that incentive pay is greater for U.S. CEOs than for those in
any other country).
19. The problem that managers would not take the risks necessary to improve shareholder
value has been addressed as the problem of agency costs. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen &
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Ageny Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3J. FIN. EcoN. 305, 312-30 (1976).
20. See William A. Klein, The Moder Business Organization: Bargaining Under Constraints, 91 YALE
L.J. 1521, 1557 (1982) (noting that "efficiency . . . requires managerial specialization and
discretion, thereby creating opportunities for shirking').
21. See, e.g., Core & Guay, supra note 18, at 4 (noting that CEO pay at large firms has grown in
tandem with the size and value of the firms).
18.

6:101 (2011)

The Risks of Reward

107

are highly paid, but no one suggests that their pay should be regulated. 22 Like
these stars, there are few people in the employment pool qualified for CEO
stardom. 23 According to this view, then, CEOs' outsize pay packages are a
function of their rare talent.
The argument that CEOs are being paid for their talent assumes an active
market for corporate talent. This premise is questionable at best. CEOs are
either promoted from (and retained) within the firm, or they are hired from
the outside. Internal hiring is the predominant method. 24 When firms do
turn to outsiders, it is generally in a crisis. 25 Promotions from within are likely
to be the result of the incumbent CEO's choice, and present the problem of
managerial influence over CEO pay. Hiring from outside under pressure to
hire a charismatic CEO to turn the company around presents the problem of
the board acting under insufficient information and with insufficient time,
placing far too much emphasis on charisma rather than results. 26 Neither
situation has the characteristics of an efficient market.
Both arguments-that CEOs are being paid for performance and that
they are being paid for their talent-depend on the premise that boards
actively negotiate with managers in the shareholders' interests, paying enough
to attract talent and induce the CEO to remain with the firm, but avoiding

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

Stephan M. Bainbridge, Remarks on Say on Pay: An Unjustified Incursion on Director Authority
1-2 (UCLA Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Res. Paper Series, Paper No. 08-06, 2008), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1 101688.
See, e.g., David I. Walker, The Manager' Share, 47 WM. & MARY L. Ruv. 587, 608 (2005)
(observing that "[tihe number of candidates that a Fortune 500 firm would consider
would be few").
Scott Thurm, Directors Now Prefer Insiders in Search for CEOs, WALL ST. J., May 2, 2007, at
A2 (discussing study showing that in 2005 only 40% of CEOs hired by S&P 500 firms
were outsiders, and that this dropped to 15% in 2006).
See Charles M. Yablon, Review Essay: Is the Market for CEOs Rational?, 4. N.Y.U. J. L. &
Bus. 89, 114 (2007) (noting that "the events precipitating the need for a new CEO are
likely to have been traumatic . . . and [to have resulted in] a felt need to reassure
shareholders and the investing public by placing a new confidence-inspiring CEO in place
relatively quickly").
See RAKESH KHURANA, SEARCHING FOR A CORPORATE SAVIOR: THE IRRATIONAL QUEST

FOR CHARISMATIC CEOs 188-90 (2002) (discussing the process of CEO hiring in which
irrational choices for CEO are predicated on too little information, too early of a focus on
a single candidate, and too great an emphasis on CEO charisma, giving the chosen
candidate a huge amount of bargaining power). Outside candidates generally obtain
higher compensation than internal candidates, perhaps because of the crisis context. See
also Kevin Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation: ManagerialPower Versus the Perceived
Cost of Stock Ophons, 69 U. CHI. L. Ri-v. 847, 852-54 (2002) (arguing that data showing
that outsiders command higher pay than insiders infers that board capture is fallacious).
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inefficient terms and linking pay to performance to reduce agency costs. 27
With respect to an internal candidate, there may be unequal bargaining power
because of the candidate's relationship with the incumbent CEO (who will
have groomed and promoted the candidate, and therefore has a stake in
seeing that the candidate is perceived-and paid-well). In the case of an
external candidate, there may be unequal bargaining power because of the
crisis precipitating the hiring. Once the initial pay package has been set, it is
unlikely to decrease, since any decrease would be seen as a vote of no
confidence, spurring CEO departure, and precipitating a new crisis.
Moreover, as behavioral studies of group interactions predict, 28 and as
Bebchuk and Fried posited in their seminal work, Pay Without Performance: The
Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation,29 the premise of arms-length
bargaining is often illusory. All too frequently, CEOs have received
substantial pay even when their firms were floundering. The comparison
with athlete and film star pay is similarly inapt, since their pay packages are far
more transparent than CEOs', and contain none of the hidden pay common
in executive pay packages, such as post-retirement perks, deferred
compensation arrangements, and retirement bonuses.30
Finally, there is the question of what performance is being measured, and
how well that relates to the overall well-being of the firm. The measure of
performance is, in practice, defined almost entirely in terms of short-term
(usually quarterly) stock price gains. Short-term incentives played an even
larger role in setting executive compensation in the 2009 proxy season than
they had previously. 31 Long-term programs actually were reduced. 32 This
suggests that executive pay packages may distort firm policies and destroy
firm value over the long term.
A singular focus on short-term stock price gains as the criterion for
performance overlooks the importance of long-term investments in the firm,
especially investment in labor. The inequalities in pay between the CEO and
other workers (including middle managers) may decrease firm value by
demoralizing the workforce and undercutting teamwork.33 In addition, if
27.

LUCIAN BEBICHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED
PROMISE OF Exrcunvi COMPENSATION 2-3 (2004).

28. See infra Part III.B.
29. Id.at3-4.
30. Id at 5-6.
31. Gretchen Morgenson, The Quick Buck Just GotQuicker, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2009, at BU1.
32. Id.
33. Troy A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Behavioral Corporate Finance, CEOs, and
Corporate Governance, 32 FIA. ST. U. L. REv. 673, 712 (2005) (noting that "studies show
that pay inequality can demoralize workforces and undercut collegiality and teamwork").
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workers do not make sufficient wages to buy the widgets produced by
society's firms, the firms will suffer.34 The deep economic crises of capitalism
stem from insufficient demand for the goods the system could produce.35
C. The Role of Stock Options in Skyrocketing Pay
Protests about the disconnect between executive pay and performance
are not new. Responding to public outcry in 1993, Congress enacted Section
162(m) of the tax code, limiting corporate tax- deductions for employee
compensation to $1 million in publicly owned corporations, unless the pay
was linked to performance of the executive and the corporation. 36 This had
two unintended side effects, both of which increased executive pay levels.
First, as a practical matter, the $1 million deductibility limit became the floor
for executive pay. 37 Second, section 162(m) caused a sea-change in the use of
conventional stock options in pay packages. 38
Congress made a blanket exception to the million dollar deductibility cap
for stock options in section 162(m).39 As a result, awarding a large percentage
of compensation in stock options became the most common way for firms to
make the link between pay and performance. 40 Although there has been
some retrenchment on the usage of stock option grants-they have declined
34. See, e.g., DAVID SCHWEICKART, AFTER CAPITALISM 42 (2009) (explaining Keynes's theory
that "the key to a healthy capitalist economy is effective demand").
35. Id.
36. I.R.C. § 162(m) (2006). See Meredith R. Conway, Money for Nothing and the Stocks for Free:
Taxing Executive Compensation, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. Pot'Y 383, 397 (2008) (discussing
the history of tax proposals designed to rein in executive pay).
37. See Ryan Miske, Note, Can't Cap CorporateGreed: Unintended Consequences of Trying to Control
Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1673, 1675 (2004); Gregg D.
Polsky, Controlling Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
877, 918 (2007) (citing studies showing that "unaffected firms also increased executive
compensation").
38. Stock option grants in the U.S. went from 27% of CEO compensation in 1992 to over
60% by 2000. CONF. BD. COMM'N ON PUB. TRUST & PRIVATE ENTER., FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, PART 1: EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 4 (2002), available at

http://www.conference-board.org/pdf free/SR-03-04.pdf.
Qualified compensation-remuneration paid pursuant to a plan that is based on objective
performance goals, approved by an independent compensation committee and the
shareholders-is not subject to the deductibility cap. I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(C).
40. Conventional stock options-fixed, at the money options, exempted from the § 162(m)
cap-are issued with a strike price at or above the fair market value on the date of the
grant. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(vi)(A) (1996) (providing that in order to qualify under §
162(m), the compensation attributable to a stock option or stock appreciation right must
be based solely on an increase in the value of the stock after the date of the grant).
39.
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from 98% usage among the 250 largest U.S. corporations in 1999 to 77%
usage in 2009-stock options are still the most common form of incentive. 41
Stock options are meant to align the interests of management with that of
shareholders. Executives will only exercise the options if the market price of
the stock when vested exceeds the exercise price; as a result, managers have
an incentive to maximize shareholder value. But the fly in the ointment is
that executives benefit whenever there is a rising market, not necessarily from
their own efforts. Moreover, the ability of managers to choose the timing of
their stock sales and sell large amounts of stock over a short period may
encourage managers to attempt to manipulate the stock price before selling. 42
In addition, adjusting pay downward for poor performance is a rare
phenomenon. 43 In any event, a recent study concluded that there is little
evidence that section 162(m) made executive pay any more performancesensitive."
II. WHAT'S AT STAKE: THE RISKS OF UNBRIDLED REWARD

Executive pay is a complex issue because of the many incentives that are
involved. Most obviously, firms seek to attract and retain talented leaders.
To do this they need to pay a market rate, which they need to be able to
ascertain. Firms also seek to reward CEOs for past performance and give
them incentives to improve the firm's prospects (or increase shareholder
value, as it is usually described). At the same time, betting the firm on risky
endeavors is generally discouraged.
Each of these concepts is fraught with troubling definitional and
operational problems. Ascertaining the market rate for executives of large

41.

42.

43.

44.

FREDERICK W. COOK & CO., THE 2009 Top 250 REPORT: LONG-TERM INCENTIVE
GRANT PRACTICES FOR EXECUTIVEs 5 (2009), available at http://www.fwcook.com/
alertletters/2009Top-250-Report.pdf.
See Jesse M. Fried, Hands Off Options, 61 VAND. L. REV. 453, 455 (2008) (contending that
existing legal rules and compensation arrangements do little to solve the problem of
managerial incentives to manipulate stock prices and suggesting that boards adopt a policy
of announcing a fixed gradual schedule for cashing out executive options, removing
executives' control over the timing of equity sales).
See, e.g., In re Viacom, Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig. No. 60527/05, 2006 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 2891, at *24 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 23, 2006) (noting the rarity of downward
adjustments in declining to dismiss shareholder claims that directors breached their
fiduciary duty in approving $160 million in compensation to three executives at a time
when the company faced a $17.5 billion loss).
See Nancy L. Rose & Catherine Wolfram, Regulating Executive Pay: Using the Tax Code to
Influence Chief Executive Oficer Compensation, 20 J. LAB. EcON. S138, S141 (2002) (discussing
the effect of § 162(m) on CEO performance).
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corporations is far from easy, especially since the disciplining market for
corporate control has been virtually dismantled by anti-takeover legislation
and court approval of defensive measures. 45 Paying for performance is also
complicated by questions of how to define and measure performance, as well
as the time over which performance is to be measured. What performance?
Performance when?
In the period leading up to the financial crisis, both tax and accounting
rules favored pay packages for executives that consisted primarily of
immediately exercisable at-the-money options, taxable when exercised rather
than when they were issued.46 Compensation packages thus explicitly began
to focus on stock prices.47 This focus on short-term stock price as the
criterion for performance gave rise to an increased temptation to manipulate
earnings. It also discouraged investments in research and development,
which typically take years to pay off.
Finally, there is the notion of risk. On the one hand, boards seek to
incentivize CEOs to undertake risk so that shareholders will prosper. On the
other hand, undertaking too much risk may sink the firm, a result that boards
and shareholders certainly will want to avoid. When firms are intertwined (as
the notion of "too big to fail" implies), too much risk taking may sink not
only the firm, but the whole economy. Regulation is needed to ensure that
these large intertwined firms internalize the costs of their actions. 48
A. Firm Risk
Originally conceived as a way to align managerial interests with those of
their shareholders, paying executives with stock options may have the
unintended consequence of pushing CEOs to undertake risks beyond what is
optimal for their common shareholders. Empirically, CEOs are less prone to
See REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 163-89 (2004)
(contrasting the U.S., which gives the board broad authority to determine whether an
offer will reach the shareholders, with the U.K., which limits managers ability to interfere
with a takeover offer). The cyclical nature of the takeover market is also a factor,
influenced by high costs and the availability of credit. See Walker, supra note 23, at 608-10
(discussing the cyclical nature of the takeover market).
46. Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the U.S., 1950-2005: Of Shareholder
Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REv. 1465, 1530 (2007).
47. Id. at 1532 (noting that "stock prices had become the bellweather performance measure'".
48. See KENNETH R. FRENCH ET AL., THE SQUAM LAKE REPORT: FIXING THE FINANCIAL
SYSTEM 80-81 (2010) (explaining that the possibility of bailouts means that stakeholders
do not face the full cost of their failure, increasing the potential for systemic risk, and
requiring capital market reform).
45.

112

Virginia La <&Business Review

6:101 (2011)

engage in risky transactions when their pay is unlinked to share
performance. 49 Some risk is a good thing: if the executive does nothing risky,
the firm is unlikely to prosper. Thus, by paying executives in stock or stock
options, boards hope to make executives more willing to undertake valueenhancing transactions.50 But option pay pushes beyond this, encouraging
riskier transactions than shareholders would wish because the executive does
not share in the downside risk from decreasing stock prices that shareholders
face. (If the options are out of the money when exerciseable, the executive
will simply let them expire.) This means that CEOs paid in options will be
more risk-preferring than their shareholders. 5 '
An executive's in-the-money options (those with a market value strike
price) will only pay off if the market value increases, otherwise they will be
worthless. In considering a risky strategy that has even chances of increasing
or decreasing asset value, the executive thus has the incentive to engage in the
risky strategy, because only if the risky strategy succeeds will the options be
worth anything.5 2 Failure to take the risk--even if the odds are uncertainwill only mean that the options expire worthless. Thus, there is little incentive
not to take the risk. 53
The option holder is thereby insulated from the downside risk that
shareholders experience. 54 As a result, executives may be willing to engage in
strategies that increase the short-term value of the stock price regardless of
the long-term results. In the current financial crisis, lax lending practices and
over-exposure to derivatives appear to have been the risks of choice, but
prior crises where the risky conduct was earnings manipulation (e.g., the
49.

See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers' Pay, 98 GEo. L.J. 247,
262 (2010) (citing studies involving bank CEOs).
50. See Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, Are CEOs Rea/y Paid Like Bureaucrats?, 113 Q. J.
EcoN. 653, 653-56 (1998) (contending that the shift to equity-based compensation from
1980-99 correlated to executives' increased willingness to engage in internal restructuring,
acquisitions, and other value enhancing transactions).
51. Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 49, at 263 (observing that the "holder of an option only
cares about share price fluctuations above the strike price").
52. Id at 272 (providing the example of Bank of America, whose options-because its share
price had dropped significantly during the financial crisis-were far out of the money
favored very aggressive risk taking because "only very large stock price gains will yield a
positive payoff. . . [and] small gains would not be able to pull up the stock price above
the exercise price").
53. While option pay unquestionably incentivizes short-term, risky behavior, there are still
some incentives not to take undue risks, such as the prospect of executive job loss if the
risk does not pan out. These risks, however, are minimized in light of the high pay levels
(giving executives a measure of independence from salary) and the common existence of
golden parachutes.
54. Id. at 264.
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Enron and WorldCom debacles) also appear to have such short-term myopia
at their core.55
In sum, while shareholders would certainly encourage risk taking that, if
successful, would drive up the price of their shares, this preference is
constrained by the specter of downside losses. Option holders have no such
constraints. They have little to lose (human capital and reputation count for
something, but pale beside the prospect of upside gains) and everything to
gain from the upside.
This means that for option holders like the CEO, if a risky strategy
succeeds, she will benefit; if it fails (and the firm survives), very little happens
Although directors acting on behalf of the
to the executive's pay.
shareholders ought to resist such managerial risk-taking, boards instead
appear to consistently approve these actions. 56 While one might expect that
publicizing this pay for failure would shame CEOs and the boards
responsible for their pay packages into acting with more restraint, this has not
been the case. During the financial crisis, firms simultaneously received
taxpayer bailout money, paid huge executive compensation, and laid off
workers.57 Even the prospect of extraordinarily bad press did not deter these
boards from approving large pay packages.
When CEO pay packages depend on short-term profits, the CEOs will
understandably undertake risks to ensure that these short-term profits are
realized.58 If performance is being measured by scrutinizing quarterly
earnings reports, the result will be excessive pressure to make those numbers

55. See David 1.Walker, The Challenge of Improing the Long-Term Focus of Executive Pay, 51 B.C. L.
Ri-v. 435, 439 (2010) (discussing the "reckless pursuit of short-term profits by corporate
executives who will have cashed out before the long-term repercussions are felt").
56. Ivan E. Brick et al., CEO Compensation, Director Compensation, and Firm Performance: Evidence
of Cronyism?, 12J. CORP. FIN. 403, 421 (2006).
57. Sarah Anderson et. al,Executive Excess 2009: America's Bailout Barons, INSTITUTE FOR
PoIcy STUDIES (Sept. 2, 2009), http://www.ips-dc.org/files/439/EE09final.pdf (noting
that in 2008, while the CEOs of the top 20 firms receiving treasury funds averaged
$13.7M in personal compensation, the same top 20 bailout recipients laid off more than
160,000 employees).
58. See D.A. Jeremy Telman, The Business Judgment Rule, Disclosure, and Executive Compensation, 81
Tui. L. REv. 829, 857-58 (2007) (noting the divergence of interests between
management, whose pay depends on hitting short-term performance objectives, and
shareholders who may value a long-term accumulation of value in corporations). There
may also be a conflict between short-term shareholders and buy-and-hold shareholders.
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look good.59 This provides incentives to pursue short-term gain at the
expense of long-term benefits.
A short-term pay period focus means that the long-term consequences of
risk-taking are often overlooked. For example, in a recent survey of 400 U.S.
CFOs, 55% indicated that they would delay investments in order to meet
quarterly earnings expectations, even at the expense of long-term value
creation. 60 The claw-back provisions to performance-based executive pay,
written into Sarbanes-Oxley Act in response to the previous financial crisis
involving Enron and WorldCom (among others), 61 should have warned
compensation committees and executives about the dangers of a short-term
perspective, but short-term practices appear to have continued unabated. 62
Moreover, this short-term focus on the part of executives and their
boards of directors means that there is strong temptation to compensate for
stock gains without taking even firm-wide risk adequately into account. It
may take some time before the deleterious effects of failure to invest in
research and development, for example, are felt in the corporation. By the
time the corporation actually sees the effects in its bottom line, the research
department may have been long dismantled. The pressure on executives to
meet the quarterly earnings forecasts also contributes to this problem. If
structured financing ventures are prevalent, for example, even if the CEO and
the board have substantial doubts about the practice, CEOs have incentives
to "ride a bubble until bust before] it bursts" 63-continuing to engage in risky
structured financing transactions even if they have doubts about the
soundness of the strategy-because otherwise they risk losing out on
substantial short-term profits. The higher the compensation, and the more
closely it is tied to the price of the firm's stock, the greater the incentive to
ride that bubble. And if the CEO fails to jump off in time, he always has his
golden parachute.
As a result of this short-term focus on pay period rather than long-term
results, and the heavy use of stock options in paying executives, the upside

61.

See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 27, at 125-26 (noting that executive contracts which
now routinely reward CEOs for reporting increased earnings create incentives to inflate
the numbers).
Simon C.Y. Wong, Uses and Limits of Convenional Corporate Governance Instruments: Analysis
and Guidancefor Reform - Part One, GLOBAL CORP. GOVERNANCE FORUM, Issue 14, at 7
(2010).
See infra notes 143-147.

62.

See, e.g., ASPEN INSTITUTE, LONG TERM VALUE CREATION: GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR

59.

60.

CORPORATIONS AND INVESTORS 3-4 (2007), available at http://www.aspeninstitute.org/
sites/default/files/content/docs/pubs/AspenPrinciples withsigners.April_09.pdf.
63. Richard A. Posner, Are American CEOs Overpaid, and, if so, What if Anything Should be Done
About It?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1041 (2009).
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potential for profits has become unlinked from the risk of loss. Linking pay
to short-term gains through options appears to magnify the risks that
executives are willing to take, since they are compensated for stock price
increases, but unlike shareholders, are not punished for decreases in share
price. 64 This also encourages the CEO to increase firm leverage in order to
magnify potential returns on firm investments. 65 This kind of compensation
structure may threaten the safety of the firm. As Richard Posner remarked,
"a CEO cushioned against loss has an incentive to take high risks in order to
maximize the expected value of his stock options." 66 Moreover, in large,
interconnected firms, compensation structures which encourage risk-taking
may threaten the safety and soundness not only of the particular firm, but of
the entire financial system.67
B. Systemic Risk
As we have seen in the current financial crisis, far more is at stake than
just the fate of a particular firm. When firms are "too big to fail," their risk
taking affects all of us. Too great or too little in the way of risk-taking
incentives can affect the entire economy. With too few incentives for risk
taking, the economy may stagnate, while incentives that are too great may
result in collapse. Incentives for risk taking arise when "the sensitivity of
payoffs on the downside is lower than the sensitivity of payoffs to the
upside." 68 Compensation structures that insulate executives from downside
risk may encourage excessive risk taking, and thus pose a danger that
reverberates throughout the economy.

64.

That is, designing executive pay packages to reward short-term performance, coupled with
the use of options as the form of compensation, increases the focus on short-term results,
even though the options themselves may not vest for a year or two, because what counts
for the executive is the exercise price. In the meantime, managers are able to off-load
their risk by hedging prior to the exercise date.

65. Id.
66. Id. at 1027.
67. Jeffrey N. Gordon, "Say on Pay". Cautionag Notes on the U.K. Expeience and the Case for
Shareholder Opt-In, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGis. 323, 365 (2009) (noting that while Enron was
brought down at least in part by misguided compensation strategies, that failure was
internalized, while the failure of Lehman reverberated through the system).
68. Core & Guay, supra note 18, at 26 (explaining that "greater stock-based pay can potentially
either mitigate or exacerbate any existing incentive alignment problems, depending on
whether the executive had the right amount, too much, or too little equity incentives to
begin").
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In addressing this problem with respect to financial institutions, Bebchuk
and Spamann suggest paying executives with a broader segment of firm
assets, such as preferred stock and outstanding bonds.69 Bebchuk and
Spamann limit their suggestion to banks because banks present a special cost
due to the externalities (e.g., taxpayer bailouts) imposed on society, but these
externalities are present whenever a firm is "too big to fail" (the bailout of
General Motors comes to mind). Because firms today obtain their financing
by directly accessing the capital markets, banks are no longer the sole source
of systemic risk; increasingly important are capital market linkages. 70 The size
of a firm's exposure to other market participants correlates to the risk they
pose to the economy.7 '
Schwarcz defines "systemic risk" as a chain of bad economic
consequences (increases in the cost of capital or decreases in its availability)
arising from a trigger event, such as market or institutional failure. 72 He
distinguishes systemic risk from what he terms "systematic risk," periodic
market downturns that affect most market participants and facilitate market
equilibrium. 73 Other than the length and severity of the downturn, however,
it is unclear what distinguishes the two. In any event, Schwarz would agree
that government intervention is necessary whenever there is a catastrophic
potential threat to the economy.74 Systemic risk cannot be mitigated by
diversification, since it arises from a broad market failure. 75
The reason to regulate systemic risk, Schwarcz explains, is that it poses a
"tragedy of the commons," a situation in which market participants only have
incentives to benefit themselves, rather than the economic system in which
they participate. 76 A common environmental example of the tragedy of the
commons is the problem of over-fishing the oceans. Each fisherman has an
incentive to catch as much fish as possible for as long as possible, even
though the fisherman knows that the oceans are being overfished-a result
that, in the long term, causes everyone to suffer. When the benefits of
69.

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

76.

Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 49, at 284 (noting that this would expose executives to "a
broader fraction of the negative consequences of risks taken," thereby reducing incentives
for excessive risk-taking).
Steven L. Schwarcz, jystemic Risk, 97 GEo. L.J. 193, 200 (2008).
Id at 204 (noting that "even ordinary operating companies can and sometimes do engage
in aggressive or converging investment strategies similar to those used by hedge funds").
Id. at 198-200 (citing the classic example of a bank run).
Id.at 204.
Id. at 198.
See Erik F. Gerding, Code, Crash and Open Source: The Outsouringof FinancialRegulation to Risk
Models and the Global Financial Cisis, 84 WASH. L. REv. 127, 138-39 (2009) (discussing
forms of risk).
Schwarcz, supra note 70, at 206.
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exploiting a common resource (here, the market economy) accrue to select
individuals while the downside risks are spread out among all market
participants, those select individuals lack the necessary incentives to limit their
activities. Similarly, even if risky decision-making may ultimately cause the
firm (and the economy) to crater, the individual CEO still has incentives to
grab while the grabbing is good.
Just as the fisherman has no incentive to catch fewer fish, since if he
refrains others will catch the fish he let go, executives have no incentive to
refrain from demanding (and boards from awarding) huge pay packages. This
is well illustrated by the unseemly bonuses that were paid by TARP recipients.
Commons problems need a regulatory solution. What that solution might be
depends on the dynamics of the players involved: boards, CEOs, and
shareholders.
III. SETTING EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION

Executive pay packages should be structured to provide incentives for
executives to undertake an optimal amount of risk, both for the health of the
firm and the health of the general economy. This is therefore one of the
most important tasks of the board of directors. Given the importance of this
endeavor,one might think that there would be an army of experts engaged in
the task of generating statistical metrics and producing reams of research and
empirical studies on this topic, and that debates over these factors would
become a primary focus of boards seeking to set executive pay. One would
There are few such studies, and they rarely enter the
be mistaken.
deliberations of the compensation committee.
Instead, boards tend to base the amount and structure of the pay package
on what CEOs at comparably sized firms in the industry make. Moreover,
since no board cares to admit that their CEO is in the lower half of the talent
pool, the focus tends to be on what the upper half is making. Why is such an
irrational process prevalent in boardrooms across the country? The structure
of the board and board dynamics offer some insights.
A. Board Role
Corporate statutes universally provide that corporations are to be
managed by or under the direction of the board of directors.77 This is
77. See, e.g., DiL. CODiE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2010).

See a/so MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE
STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 140 (1976) (observing that despite
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because directors are supposed to mitigate the risk caused by the separation
of ownership and control, i.e., the risk that those in control will line their
pockets at the expense of the investors, either by diverting funds or by
shirking. 78 Because widely dispersed shareholder systems, such as those of
the United States and the United Kingdom, face collective action problems
when it comes to monitoring those in control, shareholders must delegate
such monitoring to their representatives: the board of directors. 79
Shareholders should then be able to use their voting power to hold the
directors accountable for making sure the corporation is run in the interests
of shareholders.
1. Board Composition
Over the last decade, boards have been getting smaller and more
independent.80 Most boards in large corporations now consist primarily of
independent directors, that is, directors without direct financial or family ties
Theoretically, this should be good news for
to the corporation. 8 '
shareholders, who could logically expect such small, independent boards to
actively engage in arms-length bargaining on their behalf. Because inside
directors are widely acknowledged to be co-optable by the management they
are supposed to monitor-insiders' careers often depend on the good graces
of the CEO-increasing the role of independent directors has been seen as
the solution.82 In theory, independent boards will improve monitoring
this universal doctrine, "in the typical large, publicly held corporation the board does not
'manage' the corporation's business . . . [but] that function is vested in the executives.").
In fact, Eisenberg found that boards of large corporations tended not to initiate decisions,
and largely passively approved those initiated by management. Id
78.

See ADOLPH A. BEiRLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND

PRIVATE PROPERTY 119-25 (1933) (describing the effects of separating ownership and
control and discussing the ramifications of the ensuing agency problems).
79. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Federal Corporate Law: Lessons from Histoy, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1793, 1804 (2006) (explaining that in large publicly held corporations,
"shareholders have little incentive to exert effort to monitor management and actively
intervene in corporate decisionmaking").
80. See Yablon, supra note 25, at 104-05 (observing that "the dramatic increase in levels of
CEO compensation" correlate with a period where there are more outside directors on
the board, more boards have a majority of outside directors, "more instances where
independent directors meet separately from the CEO," and "there has been a substantial
decrease in board size').
81. NYSE Listing Rules require the majority of the board to be independent. NYSE, INC.,
LISTED CO. MANUAL § 303A.01 (2003).
82. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross & Robert A. Prentice, Economies, CapitalMarkets, and Securities Laws
11 (U. Tex. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 73, 2006), available at
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because they will be less willing to rubber stamp management policies and
more willing to consider alternative courses of action. Given this trend
toward more independent boards, why then has executive pay continued to
rise in such a meteoric fashion? There are several explanations for this
phenomenon.
First, shareholders actually have very little input into the process by
which new members of the board are selected.83 Far from being selected by
shareholders, directors frequently are selected for consideration by the
CEO.84 Although the slate of directors is put forward by the nominating
committee, the names on the slate are generally suggested by the CEO. The
shareholders may vote for the directors, but unless there is a proxy fight, they
do not have much real choice. Proxy fights are extremely rare. The number
of nominations generally matches the number of open board positions.85
Moreover, insiders often retain a strong influence even where the
majority of the board is composed of outside directors. 86 For example, the
CEO may be board chair set the agenda, provide the information that the
board will use in its deliberations, and dominate deliberations. As of 2007,
only 37% of S&P 500 companies had separate board chairs and CEOs, and
only 11% had independent chairs.87 Thus, while independent boards are
meant to improve corporate governance through more active board
monitoring, the question of whether this occurs in fact is subject to
With respect to executive pay, the corporate
considerable debate.88

83.

84.
85.

86.

87.
88.

http://ssrn.com/abstract=908927 (noting that boards of directors "plainly have failed" at
the task of monitoring managers).
See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 Bus. LAw. 43, 45
(2003) (noting that "[although shareholder power to replace directors is supposed to be
an important element of our corporate governance system, it is largely a myth").
See Cross & Prentice, supra note 82, at 11-12.
Jayne W. Barnard,ShareholderAccess to the Proxy Reisited, 40 CATH. U. L. Ruv. 37, 38 (1990)
(observing that shareholders "are neither permitted to play a meaningful role in the
selection of directorial candidates, nor to choose among competitive candidates for scarce
board positions").
See James P. Walsh & James K Seward, On the Efficiengy of Internal and External Corporate
Contrl Mechanisms, 15 ACAD. MGT. Ruv. 421, 434 (1990) (citing studies showing that
"there does not yet seem to be consensus support (either theoretically or empirically) for
the conventional wisdom that either an increased presence of outsiders on the board of
directors or the increased ownership stakes by any shareholder group (including
management) necessarily improve corporate performance").
Patel, supra note 7, at 10.
See, e.g., Erica Beecher-Monas, Marrying Diversity and Independence in the Boardroom: Just Now
Far Have You Come, Baby?, 86 OR. L. REv. 373, 375 (2007) (discussing the debate over
increasing director independence as a solution to monitoring problems).
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governance solution to executive influence has been to set up independent
compensation committees that deliberate in the absence of the CEO. Yet
even when the CEO is absent from deliberations, the CEO will have
enormous influence over the selection of his successor. In a crisis situation,
where the CEO has departed, the successor's pay will still be determined in
light of the departed CEO's pay; a new candidate will be unlikely to take
anything less, and most likely will demand more.
Furthermore, most board members are the CEOs of other public
companies.89 As CEOs, their payment structures and levels are probably
similar to those they are considering, and they also have boards that will set
their pay. Because directors who are CEOs of other firms will have their own
pay set in comparison to CEOs in similar firms, they are unlikely to view
these comparable pay packages as exorbitant. In addition, compatibility is the
key to invitations to serve on a board of directors.90 This suggests that
directors are likely to identify with the CEO. In effect, the relationship
between the CEO and the directors is a cozy one in which they hire and
retain each other.91 Absent a crisis, there are great pressures on the board to
keep the CEO happy, and ever-increasing pay appears to accomplish that.
2. Compensation Committees
The use of independent compensation committees advised by executive
compensation firms was supposed to solve the problem of board capture.
New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") listing rules now require that the
compensation committee consist solely of independent directors.92 The
underlying premise is that independent directors will be more willing (and
able) to actively bargain over pay.
89. Michael B. Dorff, Softening Pharaoh'sHeart: 1arnessingAltruistic Theoy and BehavioralLaw and
4
Economics to Rein in Executive Salaries, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 811, 845 n.1 5 ("CEOs of other
companies constitute some 63% of outside directors'); KORN/FERRY INT'L, 30TH
ANNUAL BOARD OF DIREcTORS STUDY 10 (2003), available at http://www.kornferry.com/
Publication/3321 (finding that 83% of boards included a CEO or chief operating officer
of another firm in 2002).
90. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board - Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55
VAND. L. Riv. 1, 37 (2002) ("invitations to the board are based heavily on matters like
compatibility and 'fit") (quoting Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate
Boards: Law, Norms and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountabilioy, 89 Gio.
L.J. 797, 797 (2001)).
91. See Yablon, supra note 25, at 121 (noting that "CEOs and directors are each effectively
responsible for hiring and retaining one another, the CEO through control of the board
nomination process, the board through its hiring and firing power').
92. NYSE LISTED CO. MANUAL § 303A.06 (2009).
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This may not be the solution to the problem of excessive pay, however.
When it comes to setting CEO compensation, independent directors seem to
make little difference; having a high level of independence appears (counterintuitively) correlated with high executive compensation. 93
Golden
parachutes are actually more prevalent in firms with independent boards. 94
Why this should be so is unclear, although there are several factors that may
contribute to the problem. First, directors as well as executives are now
routinely paid in option grants, and director pay levels appear to be correlated
to executive pay.95 Second, most independent directors are drawn from the
ranks of CEOs in other corporations, so their view of the appropriate amount
of compensation may be colored by self-interest. After all, they are
undoubtedly aware that their own pay will be set by examining the median.
Although shareholders theoretically can vote directors who fail to constrain
executive pay out of office, the reality is that shareholder challenges to
incumbent board members are very rare outside of hostile takeovers. 96 Third,
polarization effects may increase any inherent biases shared by individuals in
the group.
When setting compensation levels, a compensation committee usually
benchmarks its executives against a peer group of executives from similarly
sized firms.97 Directors do not want to believe that their executive is
substandard, so the pay will be at least the median of this group, and probably
93.

See Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Coporate Thermostat: Lessons from the Recent Finandal
Scandals About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of Internal Controls, 93 GEo. L.J.
285, 292-95 (2004) (noting that management's ability to distort information will not be
solved by the presence of independent directors on the board); Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard
Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm Performance, 54 Bus. LAW.
921, 931 (1999) (noting empirical studies suggesting that high executive remuneration is
correlated with high levels of board independence).
At Enron, for example, the
remuneration committee appeared to believe that its function was to pay Enron
S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. OF
executives more than those at competing firms.
INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMM. ON Gov'T AFFAIRS, THE ROiLE OF THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS IN ENRON'S COLLAPSE, S. REP. No. 107-70, at 53-54 (2002).

94.

See, e.g., Philip L. Cochran et al., The Composition of Boards of Directors and Inddence of Golden
Parachutes, 28 ACAD. MGMT. J. 664, 668 (1985); Harbir Singh & Farid Harianto,
Management-Board Relationshjps, Takeover Risk, and the Adoption of Golden Parachutes, 32 ACAD.
MGMT.J. 7, 20 (1989).
95. See Ivan E. Brick et al., supra note 56, at 421 (presenting data suggesting directors have
incentives to increase the level of executive pay to increase their own compensation).
96. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 27, at 25 (observing that between 1996 and 2002
electoral challenges to incumbents outside the hostile takeover context averaged about
two per year in corporations with market capitalization greater than $200M).
97. See Wong, supra note 60, at 15 (discussing the process of setting executive pay).

Virginia Law & Business Review

122

6:101 (2011)

somewhat above it. The problem with this system is that it results in a
constant ratcheting upwards of the pay levels for all executives.98
3. Compensation Advisors
Compensation committees do not work in a vacuum. They have experts
upon whom they may rely. The committees are usually advised by
compensation consultants, who typically present a comparison study of pay
for similarly situated CEOs. These experts may also be conflicted. Because
the incumbent CEO often has considerable influence in hiring the expert, the
expert has considerable interest in pleasing the CEO. 99 In addition to
desiring repeat business from the compensation committee, executive
compensation consulting firms often perform other, far more lucrative,
services for the firm and thus may be inclined to produce figures pleasing the
executive.100
Most firms providing compensation consulting also perform many other
services, and compensation consulting tends to generate only a small portion
of their returns.101 For example, in 2006, executive compensation consulting
firm Hewitt generated $2 billion in other consulting revenues, and only $850
million in executive compensation consulting.102 Sixty-three percent of the
largest firms hiring compensation consultants also used the same consulting
MetLife and PepsiCo both used
firm to perform other services. 103
compensation consultants to provide other large-fee generating services, but
nevertheless referred to the compensation consultants as "independent."1 04
Most of the firms whose consultants provided both compensation advice and
other services failed to disclose this to their investors.105

98. Id. (noting that this is a particular problem when larger firms are included in the peer
group).

99. See BEBCHUK & FluiED, supra note 27, at 38 (explaining that compensation consultants are

100.

101.

102.
103.
104.
105.

usually hired by human resource departments, with CEOs involved in the selection
process).
Gretchen Morgenson, Panelto Look at Conflicts in Consulting, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2007, at
C1 (noting that Congress issued subpoenas to executive compensation firms Hewitt
Associates, Mercer Consulting, and Towers Perrin in relation to this concern).
Letter from James F. Reda, Managing Dir., James F. Reda & Assoc., to Nancy Morris,
Sec'y, SEC 4 (Apr. 6, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/
s70306/jfreda3948.pdf.
Morgenson, supra note 100.
Gretchen Morgenson, House Panel Finds Conflicts in Executive Pay Consulting, N.Y. TIME s,
Dec. 6, 2007, at C1 (discussing Congressional investigation into consulting conflicts).
Id.
Id.
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B. Board Dynamics
Management of a corporation by or under the direction of a board of
directors is a choice to manage through a group decision process.10 6 There
are good reasons for this choice of group decision-making. Group decisions
are often superior to those of individuals. 07 As compared to individual
memory, group memory is more accurate, detailed, and retains a greater
volume of information. 08 Groups master new concepts better than
individuals. 0 9 Abstract problem solving is often better in groups.110
Yet, not all group decisions are good ones. While group processes do
assist decision-making in tasks which have a clear answer (because individual
errors in assessing information tend to cancel each other out), group
processes may skew the decision away from the optimal solution when there
is no clear right answer. Deliberations over the proper form and level of
executive pay packages rarely have clear right answers, and shared biases of
group members about whether and how to use information may skew the
Interactive groups are
decision-making process in these situations.'
especially subject to polarization effects, herding, and information cascades.
This poses particular problems with respect to decisions about executive pay.

106. Decisions of the board are made consensually. DIEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (2009)
("The vote of the majority of directors present at a meeting at which a quorum is present
shall be the act of the board of directors."). A group is defined as "made up of
individuals who see themselves and who are seen by others as a social entity, who are
interdependent because of the tasks they perform as members of a group, who are
embedded in one or more larger social systems (e.g. community, organization), and who
perform tasks that affect others (such as customers or coworkers)." Richard A. Guzzo &
Marcus W. Dickson, Teams in Organizations: Recent Research on Performance and Effectiveness, 47
ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 307, 308-09 (1996).
107. For a review of studies showing that groups consistently outperform their average
member, see Bainbridge, supra note 90, at 12-19.
108. David A. Vollrath et al., Memory Performance by DecisionMaking Groups and Individuals, 43
ORG. BEHAV. & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 289, 298 (1989).
109. Gayle W. Hill, Group Versus Individual Performance: Are N+1 Heads Better than One?, 91
PSYCHOL. BUi.i. 517, 520-22 (1982) (reviewing empirical literature). Some of the groups
in the concept mastering tasks did not outperform their best members, however. Id.
110. Id. at 524.
111. See Daniel Gigone & Reid Hastie, Proper Analysis of the Accurag of Group Judgments, 121
PSYCHOL. BULL. 149, 159 (1997) (explaining that the group performance will be at the
level of the average members).

124

Virginia Law & Business Reiew

6:101 (2011)

1. Polariation
One unexpected tendency of group decisions is that groups often
polarize;11 2 that is, group decisions tend to coalesce around an extreme
position rather than around the middle of the individually held antecedent
positions.113 This suggests that even if the individual members of a
compensation committee would prefer a more modest pay package, if the
group has a predilection toward higher pay levels, that will be the decision.
This phenomenon is more acute when the group is homogeneous, as it tends
to be at the upper echelon of corporate management, because if group
members share a particular bias, polarization may magnify its impact.114
Directors tend to be drawn from the same social and educational
backgrounds. Economic ties between board members are prohibited by the
rules on director independence, but social ties such as these are pervasive.
Shared biases are common when the group members have strong social ties.
The effects of polarization are magnified in groups with strong social ties
because such cohesive groups tend to have access to limited argument pools
and suppress dissent.) 5 Because of the phenomenon of group polarization,
risk aversion and risk preference may both be magnified in group decisions." 6
This is known as the "risky shift." 17
112. See, e.g., Daniel

J.

Isenberg, Group PolaiZation: A Critical Review and Meta-Analysis, 50

J.

PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1141, 1141 (1986) (noting that group polarization occurs

113.

114.
115.

116.

117.

when "an initial tendency of individual group members toward a given direction is
enhanced following group discussions"). For a discussion of group polarization in the
context of audit committee deliberations, see Erica Beecher-Monas, Corporate Governance in
the Wake of Enron: An Examination of the Audit Committee Soluion to Corporate Fraud, 55
ADMIN. L. REv. 357, 377-80 (2003).
See Cass R. Sunstein, Essay, Deliberative Trouble? 1Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J.
71, 85-86 (2000) ("The effect of deliberation is both to decrease variance among group
members, as individual differences diminish, and also to produce convergence on a
relatively more extreme point among predeliberation judgments.').
Isenberg, supra note 112, at 1141.
See JOHN C. TURNER ET AL., REDISCOVE RING THE SoCIAL GROUP : A SEI.FCATEGORIZATION THEORY 159-62 (1987); Dominic Abrams et al.,
Knowing What to Think
& Knoning Who You Are: Self-Categorigation and the Nature of Norm Formation, Conformity and
Group Polarization, 29 BRIT. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 97, 113-16 (1990); Russell Spears et al., DeIndividuation and Group Polarization in Computer Mediated Communication, 29 BRIT. J. Soc.
PSYCHOL. 121, 122-31 (1990).
See Paul E. Jones & Peter H. M. P. Roelofsma, The Potentialfor Sodal Contextual and Group
Biases in Team Decision-making: Biases, Conditions &' PsychologicalMecbanisms,43 ERGONOMICS
1129, 1144 (2000) (noting that two special cases of group polarization are "risky shift,"
when the group becomes more risk seeking, and "cautious shift," when the group
becomes more risk averse than the average tendencies of the individual members).
Id.
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In addition, collective processes tend to magnify systematic errors.118
These systematic errors include phenomena such as overconfidence, selfinterest, and cognitive dissonance.119 These errors may also skew group
decision-making, particularly if the group is homogeneous. Thus, while
random errors of individuals should be cancelled out by other individuals'
random errors in a group process, this does not occur if the errors are skewed
in the same direction. This suggests that the prevalence of CEOs on
corporate boards may shift the group toward a higher pay level.
Confirmation bias research suggests that people tend to believe that their
initial judgment is correct, and to ignore information that might call it into
question.120 Cognitive dissonance theory suggests that people tend to take
further actions that justify and reinforce decisions that they have already
made.121 For example, gamblers and voters are more confident after placing

118. See Norbert L. Kerr et al., Bias in Judgment: ComparingIndiiduals and Groups, 103 PsYClIOL.
REV. 687, 713-14 (1996) (noting that although the law of large numbers suggests that
random errors will cancel each other out in collective decisions, systematic errors will be
magnified).
119. The tendency to view information in a manner that will bolster our own position has been
studied in many contexts. See, e.g., Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining
Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. EcoN. PERSP. 109, 112-17 (1997)
(finding that mock settlement participants tend to view the same materials differently
depending on whether they had been assigned to the role of plaintiff or defendant, and
even where there are real consequences, such as in salary negotiations between teachers'
unions and school boards, this tendency is observable); Kimberly A. Wade-Benzoni et al.,
Egocentric Interpretations of Fairness in Asmmetric, Environmental Social Dilemmas: Explaining
Harvesting Behavior and the Role of Communication, 67 ORG. BEIHAv. & HUM. DEC. PROCESSS
111, 113 (1996) (finding evidence of egocentric biases in interpreting fairness in the
fishing industry). For a discussion of information selection biases in the context of
communications regulation, see generally Derek E. Bambauer, Shopping Badly: Cognitive
Biases, Communications, and the Falla9 of the Marketplace of Ideas, 77 U. CoLO. L. REv. 649,
673-92 (2006) (discussing information distorting biases).
120. See Hart Blanton et al., Overconfidence as Dissonance Reduction, 37 J. ExP'L Soc. PSYCHoL.
373, 373 (2001) (citing studies asking people to evaluate their ability in solving laboratory
problems and showing that "people think that they can solve problems that they cannot,
think that the have made progress toward correct solutions when they have not, and think
that they have drawn correct conclusions when they have not').
121. See generally LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957). Festinger's
theory provoked a great deal of controversy, but the empirical basis for it appears to have
survived the controversy. See, e.g., Robyn M. Dawes, Behavioral Dedsion Making and
judgment in THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 497, 557-61, 561 (Daniel T. Gilbert
et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998) (detailing the controversy and concluding that "cognitive
dissonance theory is resilient").
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their bets or votes than they were before.122 This research may explain the
similarity of pay package structures, as well as the widespread reliance on
comparison studies in place of more probing empirical studies in setting pay
levels.
In addition, the social environment of board deliberations may increase
overconfidence because people acting within small social networks have been
found to demonstrate greater levels of overconfidence. 123 Compensation
committees are essentially small social networks: they are characterized by
having three to fifteen members (a characteristic boards of directors share),
with someone in a central, coordinating position (the chair, who on boards of
directors is typically the CEO), and weak contact with outsiders (at least
during the decision process). These features of their interaction may thus
help to explain why boards are generally confident that they have hired the
top talent and therefore should pay top dollar for it.
Rather than fracturing the group into opposing views, polarization is a
consensual shift further in the direction of the group's initial tendency. 124 For
polarization to occur, there must be an initial leaning of the group in a
particular direction. 125 This kind of predilection is more common if the group
is homogeneous. For example, when there is an underlying norm endorsing
management positions, individuals would attempt to signal that they shared
the group attitude.126 This results in a kind of competition, but since no one
can be sure exactly what the average is, the value moves in the direction
favored by the group norm. This effect has been observed in studies where
122. See Blanton et al., supra note 120, at 374 (arguing that "overconfidence reflects the motive
to maintain a view of the self as a knowledgeable perceiver who makes sound
judgments").
123. See Joshua Klayman et al., Overconfidence: It Depends on How, What, and Whom You Ask, 79
ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DiEc. PRocEssEs 216, 243 (1999) (citing research finding an overall
bias toward overconfidence, particularly in small social networks).
124. James H. Lu & Bibb Latane, Extremization of Attitudes: Does Thought and Discussion-Induced
Polariation Cumulate?, 20 BAsic & App. Soc. PSYCHOL. 103, 103 (1998) (noting the
difference between popular conceptions of polarization and social scientists' conceptions
of polarization).
125. See Noah E. Friedkin, Choice Sh:ft and Group Polarization, 64 Am. Soc. Rnv. 856, 857-59
(1999) (explaining the concept of group polarization in terms of a choice shift, which
occurs "when, after a group's interaction on an issue, the mean final opinion of group
members differs from the members' mean initial opinion.. . in the opposite direction of
the initial inclination of the group").
126. See ROBERT S. BARON, NORBERT KERR & NORMAN MuiswR, GROUP PRocEss, GROUP
DECISION, GROUP AcTION 73-79 (1992) (discussing the process of polarization); Robert
S. Baron & Gard Roper, Reaffirmation of Social Comparison Views of Choice Shfs: Averaging and
Extremity Effects in an Autokinetic Situation, 33 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PsYCHot. 521, 52830 (1976) (finding that members strive to show adherence to group norms).
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the group categorized itself as either risk taking or cautious: group decisions
were observed to polarize in the risky direction by stereotypically risk-seeking
groups, and in the cautious direction by self-perceived cautious groups,
although both risky and cautious individuals tended to shift away from their
individual predilections.127
One explanation for group polarization is that groups have an internal
culture that prefers some values over others.128 This too is more likely if the
group is homogeneous. During discussions, group members attempt to
signal their adherence to these group norms, but because they do not know
ahead of time the level of group adherence to these norms, the result is a
competition that shifts the initial preferences to a more extreme level. 129 This
means that if group members share a particular bias, group dynamics may
intensify its impact.130 People wish to be perceived favorably by the group, so
they adjust their expressed opinions in line with their image of the group
position-an image already polarized because of its prototypical nature.131
Another explanation for the polarization effect is that the initial
declaration of the individual's position was more moderate than the position
the individual really held.132 As the individual realizes the group position is
more extreme, the individual is freed to express these more extreme views.133
In this explanation, there is not really a shift in underlying attitudes, but
merely an increased willingness to express previously held views. Both this
and the prior explanation are social comparison theories, and suggest that
group polarization occurs when high status members of the group hold more
extreme views than the mean.134 Thus, in the context of a compensation
committee, a CEO with a predilection for a particular view may shift the
group decision in that direction.
127. John C. Turner et al., Referent Informational Influence and Group Polarization, 28 BRIT. J. Soc.
PsYCHoL. 135, 143 (1989) (noting that "defining the shared characteristics of the group in
advance will ensure that arguments/positions/ members in line with the stereotype will
tend to be perceived as more representative of the group as a whole and hence more
persuasive and valued').
128. See Baron & Roper, supra note 126.
129. See Glenn S. Sanders & Robert S. Baron, Is Social Coparison Irrelevantfor Producing Choice
Sh;ts?, 13 J. ExPT'i. Soc. PSYCHOL. 303, 304 (1977).
130. Id.
131. JOHN C. TURNER ET AL..,REDISCOVERING THE SOCIAL GROUP: A SELF-CATPGORIZATION

THEORY 156 (1987).
132. See Isenberg, supra note 112, at 1142.
133. Id.
134. George R. Goethals & Mark P. Zanna, The Role of Social Comparison in Choice Shfts, 37
PERSONALITY & Soc.PSYCHOL. 1469, 1474-75 (1979).
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2. Relational Groups
Groups not only need to accomplish projects-such as monitoring
management-but they also must keep the group working cohesively
together. 35 Thus, in understanding how group decisions are made, it is
important to examine a number of functions: the accomplishment of group
projects, satisfaction of member needs, and maintaining the group as an
ongoing system.136 Relational teams, like boards of directors, develop strong
internal relationships and engage with each other repeatedly. This is the type
of situation that evolutionary game theory suggests produces cooperative
strategies, which may devolve into collusion.137
Groups experience enormous pressure to maintain cohesiveness. 138 As a
result of this pressure, even independent boards may fail to realistically assess
alternative courses of action, such as alternative levels and structures of
executive pay.139 The decision the group ultimately reaches is not properly
characterized as a collective decision resulting from many independent
judgments because people in a small group influence each other's judgments.
Decisions of small groups are thus more volatile and extreme than those of
the individual members. Consensus becomes more important than dissent
because dissent threatens the group's cohesion. The effects of polarization
can thus be expected to be even more pronounced for homogeneous boards
that interact over many years.

135. See Joseph E. McGrath & Linda Argote, Group Processes in OrganiZational Contexts, in
BLAcKWELL'S HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: GROUP PROCESSEs 603, 608 (M.
Hogg & R.S Tindale eds., 2000).
136. See id.
137. See Erica Beecher-Monas, Enron, Epistemology, and Accountability: Regulating in a Global
Economy, 37 IND. L. Rrv. 141, 157-80 (2003) (discussing implications of game theory for
corporate governance); Kenneth L. Bettenhausen, Five Years of Groaps Research: What We
Have Learned and What Needs to Be Addressed, 17J. MGsr. 345, 361-65 (1991) (summarizing
empirical studies on group cohesion processes).
138. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 27, at 32 (noting that boards experience "a strong
emphasis on politeness and courtesy and an avoidance of direct conflict and
confrontation") (quoting K-HURAN A, supra note 26, at 84).
139. See Samuel N. Fraidin, Duy of Care Jurisprudence: Comparing Judical Intuition and Social
Psychology Research, 38 U. C. DAVIs L. REV. 1, 51-52 (2004) (observing that although trust
and cohesiveness are held in high esteem, dissent is actually associated with more
thorough consideration of evidence and careful decisionmaking).
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3. Herding
Herding is when people ignore their own information, and instead follow
the crowd in making decisions.140
One explanation for the failure of
compensation consultants to provide more sophisticated information about
the types of pay structures that will most benefit shareholders is that they are
merely following others in their field, proposing the least controversial, most
acceptable, structures because everyone else is doing it. 141 Herding may also
explain pay levels and boards' preference for traditional stock options in
structuring pay packages over other possible structures.
IV. EFFORTS AT REFORM

Executive pay has been the focus of reform efforts for quite some time.
The exemption for stock options from the million dollar cap in pay under the
tax code is just one example.142 Curiously, executive pay keeps rising despite
these various efforts.
A. Sarbanes-Oxley
Sarbanes-Oxley, 143 which set out a plethora of new rules regarding
corporate governance reforms in the wake of the Enron and WorldCom
and director
mainly on accounting conflicts
scandals, focused
1
through its
pay
primarily
issue
of
executive
independence. 44 It addressed the
provision regarding claw-backs of bonuses and incentive pay in the event of
financial restatements resulting from misconduct.145 Section 304 requires the
CEO and CFO to repay any bonus, incentive, or equity-based compensation
received during the twelve months after the filing of the misleading financial
140. See generally Peter H. Huang, Herd Behavior in Desegner Genes, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 639,
645-53 (1999) (reviewing theories of herd behavior).
141. See Michael B. Dorff, The Grop Dynamics Theory of Execudve Compensation, 28 CARDOZO L.
REv. 2025, 2048 (2007) (noting that "consultants may tout the latest trend in
compensation because they are part of a social cascade themselves").
142. See supra text accompanying notes 36-44.
143. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) 745
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
144. As it turns out, however, when it comes to setting CEO compensation, director
independence seems to make little difference. See Erica Beecher-Monas, supra note 88, at
388 (noting that--counter-intuitively--high levels of independence correlate with high
executive compensation).
145. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 304, 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2011).
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statement, or any profits from the sale of stock within the twelve month
period.) 46 Although the restatement must be due to misconduct in order to
trigger the claw-back, the statute does not specify whose misconduct or the
extent of misconduct necessary to activate the provision. It is similarly
unclear how one would measure the amount of claw-back due to the firm. In
any event, this provision has rarely been enforced.147
B. Say on Pay
Executive pay has increasingly become the subject of shareholder
proposals. These proposals most frequently appear as "say on pay" proposals,
which ask for a non-binding advisory vote on pay packages, or "pay for
performance" proposals, which ask for a greater relationship between
executive pay and overall shareholder return. 148 The purpose of "say on pay"
is to make boards more accountable for the pay packages that they award top
executives. Dodd-Frank has made "say on pay" mandatory, with an advisory
shareholder vote on whether to approve the disclosed executive
compensation package to be held at least every three years. 149 Every six years,
the shareholders must be given an opportunity to vote on whether the
interval between the "say on pay" votes should be one, two or three years.150
The U.K. has mandated its own version of "say on pay," and the result has
been a number of negative votes.15 1 Yet, the U.K. has not seen any
corresponding decrease in executive pay.152

146. Id.
147. See Miriam A. Cherry & Jarrod Wong, Clawbacks: Prospective Contract Measures in an Era of
Excessive Executive Compensation and Poni Schemes, 94 MINN. L. Rv, 368, 376-77 (2009)
(observing that the claw-back provisions have been largely ignored, citing evidence that, as
of 2009, the SEC has brought only two claw-back enforcement actions under SarbanesOxley).
148. See Sean M. Donahue, Executive Compensation: The New Executve Compensation Disclosure Rules
Do Not Result in Complete Disclosure, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 59, 68 (2008)
(discussing shareholder proposals during the 2006 and 2007 proxy seasons).
149. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899-1900 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1).
150. Id.
151. See, e.g., Core & Guay, supra note 18, at 23 n.8 (citing as examples of negative votes on pay
Royal Dutch Shell, PLC, Royal Bank of Scotland Group, Bellway PLC, and Provident
Financial PLC, but noting that the level and growth of CEO pay does not appear to have
changed as a result).
152. Gordon, supra note 67, at 344 (observing that U.K. rates of CEO pay increased by double
digits in recent years).
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C. Disclosure
Disclosure of executive and director pay has been mandatory for over
seventy years.' 53 In 2006, the SEC's amended disclosure rules purported to
make the disclosure of executive compensation more transparent.15 4
Beginning in the 2007 proxy season, these rules were intended to revise
compensation tables and narrative disclosure into three sections: (1) a
summary compensation table, (2) equity-based interests relating to
compensation, and (3) retirement or other post-employment compensation.' 55
The new rules were intended to improve shareholders' ability to compare
compensation across companies and within the firm, and to increase
The underlying
comprehension with enhanced narrative disclosure.156
to consider
place
proposals
can
exit,
premise is that informed shareholders
shareholder approval for pay packages on proxy statements, or campaign to
cvote no" or "withhold the vote."

In July 2009, the SEC proposed new amendments to its executive
compensation disclosure rules.157 Narrative in the Compensation Discussion
and Analysis (CD&A) section is now supposed to explain the material factors
underlying compensation policies in its explanation of the data in the
These disclosures must address the firm's
compensation tables. 158
compensation objectives, an identification of every element of compensation,
and an explanation of why the firm chose each element, how it determined
the amount, and how each element fits into the firm's overall compensation
objectives. Post-employment compensation (such as pension plans and
deferred compensation), policies relating to timing of option grants and the
153. Both Schedule A of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (2011), and § 12(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (2011), require disclosure of director and
officer compensation. See Leigh Johnson et al., PreparingProxy Statements Under the SEC's
New Rules Regarding Executive and Director Compensation Disclosures, 7 U.C. DAvis Bus. L.J.
373, 376-78 (2007) (discussing the history of executive compensation disclosure).
154. Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, Securities Act Release No.
8732A, Exchange Act Release No. 54,302A, Investment Company Act Release No.
27,444A, 71 Fed. Reg. 53,157 (Sept. 8, 2006).
155. Id. at 53,160-61.
156. Id. at 53,160.
157. See Proxy Disclosure and Solicitation Enhancements, Securities Act Release No. 9052,
Exchange Act Release No. 60,280, Investment Company Act Release No. 28,817, 74 Fed.
Reg. 35,075 (July 17, 2009).
158. See id. at 35,077-79. Because the CD&A is filed with the SEC, it is subject to liability
under the Securities Exchange Act, and is covered by the CEO/CFO certification
required under Sarbanes-Oxley.
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determination of exercise prices, and the role of executives in the
compensation decision process must all be addressed.
Whether the new rules actually improved transparency is debatable. 59
The "plain language" requirements appear to have been interpreted to mean
"more language" rather than clear language; the discussion and analysis
section of proxy statements now averages twenty to thirty pages.160 Charts
that were supposed to clarify for comparison purposes appear muddled with
footnotes from one chart cross-referencing another, with some footnotes
running twelve pages or more. The instructions themselves take fifty-three
pages of prose. Sometimes more disclosure is not better disclosure.161
Notwithstanding this prolixity, key information remains absent: target
performance levels do not have to be revealed if the firm can claim the
disclosure would result in competitive harm. 162 According to the Corporate
Library, more than two-thirds of companies in the 2008 proxy season avoided
disclosure and listed fuzzy performance targets.163
In addition, the revamped disclosure did not require sufficient disclosure
of executive cumulative ownership positions, in particular, the sensitivity of
CEO wealth to changes in firm performance.164 Current share ownership
disclosure is also not required.165
The Dodd-Frank Act attempted to cure these last two deficiencies by
amending § 14 of the Securities Exchange Act to require annual disclosure of
information showing the relationship between executive compensation

159. Claudia M. DeutschA Bnghter Spothght, Yetthe Pay Rises, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2008, at BU1
(remarking that the 2008 proxy season was typified by "a blizzard of words and numbers
that did more to obscure their processes than to illuminate them .. . [while the] true links
between pay and performance remained scarce').
160. See, e.g,Johnson & Johnson, Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 21-52 (Mar. 12, 2008).
161. See John Schwartz, Transpareng, Lost in the Fog, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2007, at 3 (observing
that under the new disclosure rules, "[t]here is so much information that you can't see the
forest for the non-tax qualified deferred compensation").
162. Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, SEC Release No. 33-8655, 71
Fed. Reg. 53,166 (an. 27, 2006); see Letter from Ann Yerger, Exec. Dir., Council of Inst.
Investors, to Nancy M. Morris, Sec'y, SEC 35 (Mar. 29, 2006), available at
http://www.cii.org/UserFiles/file/testimony/06-05 07%20stock%20options%20JM%20
subcom%20investigations.pdf.
163. Deutsch, supra note 159 (noting that at most 30% of these "were really competitively
sensitive"). Representative Barney Frank suggested that a way around the competitive
harm concerns would be to require disclosure after the performance has been measured,
but this comment was not adopted. See Letter from Barney Frank, Member of House
Comm. on Fin. Serv., to Christopher Cox, Chair, SEC 2 (Apr. 10, 2006), available at
http://democrats.financialservices.house.gov/SECexeccomprulecommentletter.pdf.
164. See Gordon, supra note 67, at 331.
165. Id. at 331 n.31.
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actually paid and financial performance, taking into account changes in value
of shares, dividends and distributions.' 66 The required disclosure now also
includes disclosure of the median annual compensation of all employees
except the CEO; the annual compensation of the CEO; and the ratio of the
67
two.1
Any hedging activity by the CEO must also be reported.168
D. Restricted Stock
One proposal for better aligning shareholder interests with management
has been to increase the use of restricted stock.169 TARP requires that firms
receiving bailout funds pay their executives in restricted stock that does not
fully vest until after the government has been repaid. 70 This may better align
shareholder interests with those of management, thus addressing the problem
of firm risk, but it still ignores the problem of systemic risk.' 7'
Bhaghat and Romano propose to address the problem of systemic risk by
paying the bulk of CEO compensation in restricted stock that does not vest
until two to four years after employment ends.172 The advantage of Bhaghat
and Romano's proposal is that it aligns executives' interests with the longterm prospects of the firm, since they will be unable to take advantage of
short-term fluctuations in share price. However, as the authors themselves
acknowledge, more will have to be done to align employees' incentives with
long-term performance; for example, paying executives in restricted stock did
not prevent the massive losses at Merrill Lynch. 73 Moreover, Bhaghat and
Romano appear agnostic on the mix between incentive and non-incentive

166. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 953, 124 Stat. 1376, 1903-04 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n).
167. Id.
168. Id at §955, 124 Stat. at 1904-05.
169. Victor Fleischer, Two Quick Workarounds on Executive Pay Caps, CONGLOMERATE BLOG
(Feb. 4, 2009), http://www.theconglomrate.org/2009/o2/two-quick-work-arounds-onexecutive-pay.html.
170. 12 U.S.C. § 5221(b)(3)(D)(i() (2009). See also Fleischer, supra note 169 (noting that the
effect on executive behavior of restricted stock vesting after the government is paid back
is similar to the effect of a stock option).
171. See discussion supra Part II.
172. Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing and Committing
to the Long Term, 26 YALE J. ON RIEG. 359, 359 (2009).
173. Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: Simpliciy, Transpareng,
and Committing to the Long Term 18 (Yale Law Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. for Stud. in Law,
Econ., & Pub. Pol'y, Research Paper No. 393, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract= 1506742.
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pay, thus inviting firms to circumvent their proposal.174 An even more
important downside to their proposal is that the level of compensation would
have to increase in order to compensate the executive for having to hold an
undiversified and illiquid portfolio.175 If the growing disparity in income
levels between the labor force and chief executive is a destabilizing
problem,'76 as well as a problem for long-term performance of the firm,
paying executives in restricted stock at these necessarily higher levels will only
exacerbate these problems. Moreover, as Walker notes, achieving the proper
balance between bet-the-company risk-taking and executive risk aversion
through regulation may be extremely difficult. 77
E. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
Dodd-Frank has several provisions relating to executive pay. In addition
to the revamped disclosure rules, 78 and the advisory "say on pay" votes that
must be held at least every three years,' 79 the issuer must also disclose golden
parachute arrangements in any proxy solicitations for change of control
transactions. 80 Such arrangements must also be subject to an advisory
These
shareholder vote, unless already voted on by the shareholders.
shareholder votes are strictly advisory, however, and do not bind the board of
directors or the issuer.181
174. See Bhagat & Romano, supra note 173 at 361. Although firms would have to give up their
§ 162(m) deduction if they did this, many firms appear willing to forego the deduction for
top executives. See Steven Balsam & Qin J. Yin, Explaining Firm Willingness to Forfeit Tax
Deductions Under Internal Revenue Code Secion 162(m): The Million Dollar Cap, 24 J. Accr. &
PUB. Poi.'Y 300, 321-23 (2005) (discussing their finding that 40% of firms forfeited
deductions).
175. Bhagat and Romano would solve the diversification and liquidity problems in three ways:
first, by increasing the amount of restricted stock and options; second, by increasing the
salary deduction to $2 million; and third, by allowing executives to sell shares to the extent
needed to pay taxes incurred for receiving restricted stocks and options in excess of the
per-year limit. Bhagat & Romano, supra note 173, at 367-69.
see FRENCH ET AL., supra note 48, at 76 (expressing doubt about whether "high levels
176. nBut
of compensation are inherently destabilizing to individual firms or to the overall financial
system').
177. Walker, supra note 55, at 447.
178. See supra notes 157-165 and accompanying text.
179. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
180. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-

203, %951(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1899-1900 (to be codified at

IS U.S.C. § 78n-1) (in any

merger, acquisition, consolidation or sale of all or substantially all of the assets, the proxy
solicitation must disclose the aggregate total of all compensation, present, deferred or
contingent, and the conditions for payment).
181. Id. at § 951(c), 124 Stat. at 1900.
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Compensation committees are now required for listing on a national
The
exchange, and they must be comprised of independent directors.'1
relevant factors for director independence include sources of compensation,
consulting or advisory fees paid by the issuer, and affiliation with the issuer or
Consultants or legal advisors to the compensation
its subsidiaries.183
committee must be similarly independent. Moreover, the compensation
committee must disclose whether it obtained the advice of a consultant, and if
it had uncovered and addressed any conflict of interest. 184 The new
legislation makes it a listing requirement to develop and implement a policy
providing for disclosure of incentive compensation. 85
Claw-backs are also provided for the recovery of any compensation
erroneously awarded due to an accounting restatement resulting from material
noncompliance with financial reporting requirements.1 86 These claw-back
provisions appear more expansive than those under Sarbanes-Oxley, which
required misconduct and were seldom enforced.187 Although these claw-back
provisions appear to be broader than those enacted by Sarbanes-Oxley, in
that they require only material noncompliance rather than misconduct, the
drawbacks in enforcing such provisions remain.
V. WHAT'S TO BE DONE?

There are good reasons to be concerned about the level of executive pay
at large corporations. The disparity between CEO and worker pay erodes the
middle class and encourages excess debt to keep the engine of consumption
running.' 88 Super compensation creates conflicts of interest between the firm
and its executives.189 Yet government intervention in executive pay has not
been particularly successful in curbing exorbitant pay levels. The attempt to
link pay to performance by capping deductibility at a million dollars resulted
in huge pay increases in the form of (theoretically performance linked) stock
182. Id. at § 952, 124 Stat. at 1900-03 (amending the Securities Exchange Act by inserting §
I0C).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at §§ 953-54, 124 Stat. at 1903-04.
186. Id. at § 954, 124 Stat. at 1904 (amending the Securities Exchange Act by inserting § 10D)
187. See supra notes 143-147 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
189. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Understanding the Snbprme FinandalCdsis, 60 S. C. L. Rsv. 549,
562-63 (2009) (noting that financial independence implies a potential divergence of
individual and firm interests).
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options.'90 Attempts to limit deductibility of golden parachutes not only
failed to discourage golden parachutes, but resulted in firms extending
severance pay to any termination without cause, not just during change of
control transactions.'91
The problem with many of the solutions to the executive compensation
conundrum, such as "say on pay," is that while these provisions may curb the
most outrageous pay packages, they do not affect incentives to take excessive
risks. Even if executive pay is adjusted to better align shareholder and
management interests by issuing restricted stock or other forms of pay with
longer-term horizons, shareholders may prefer a higher level of risk taking
than is optimal for other stakeholders in the firm, or for society as a whole.
Similarly, increasing the independence and role of compensation committees
may increase the accountability of directors for the pay packages they award,
but in practice, this does little because of the dynamics of group decisionmaking. Some financial firms have attempted to take risk into account when
measuring performance.1 92 The risk that these firms measured, however, was
risk to the particular firm, rather than systemic risk.
Disclosure similarly fails to solve the problem of exorbitant pay
insufficiently linked to performance. Here there are three problems. First,
Beyond disclosing the level of
disclosure is not informative enough.
executive pay, disclosure should focus on the risk incentives of the pay
package. 93 Disclosure rules should require disclosures regarding sensitivity of
CEO wealth to performance measures such as stock price and earnings,
190. See supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
191. FRENCH ET AL., supra note 48, at 79 ("firms discovered that they could circumvent the
new taxes on golden parachute payments by extending the payments to all terminations
The tax provisions at issue are I.R.C. § 280G (golden parachute
without cause'.
payments are not deductible for the payor) and I.R.C. § 4999 (imposing a twenty percent
excise tax on golden parachutes).
192. These firms used "value at risk" (VAR), which is a quantitative model that risk managers
use to quantify a firm's (or a trader's) risk position, measured as a dollar figure. Joe
Nocera, Risk Mismanagement, N.Y. TIMI s, Jan. 4, 2009, at MM. The problem with such
models is that they are based on assumptions that may not be accurate. For example, in
valuing mortgage backed securities, the model used home price escalation assumptions
formed at the height of the housing bubble. Id. Moreover, VAR measures only the shortterm; it does not measure liquidity risk. Id. Plus, it can be gamed because it ignores
miniscule risks of loss (no matter how large the unlikely loss may ultimately be). For
example, the model was used by bankers to ignore the risk associated with credit default
swaps, which had constant small gains and only rate losses. These losses turned out to be
huge. Id.
193. See Core & Guay, supra note 18, at 28 (noting that "existing disclosures do not allow one
to easily determine the overall sensitivity of executive compensation to firm
performance").
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similar to disclosures required for the risks underlying financial instruments.194
Second, better aligning shareholder and managerial interests does not solve
the tragedy of the commons problem that directors and shareholders have
little incentive to limit systemic risk.195 Third, disclosure may have the
unintended effect of ratcheting executive pay upward and may give rise to
more opaque forms of compensation. 96
Relying on claw-backs as a reform measure is similarly fraught with
difficulty. The problem with claw-backs is that measuring the effect of
misstatements on bonus payouts can be quite complicated because
accounting measures are often multi-year, and an earnings overstatement in
one year will result in a reversal in a future period.197 Moreover, determining
whether a misstatement was material may require costly litigation.
Because of the commons problem, there is a role for government
regulation in ensuring that firms do not engage in pay practices that increase
systemic risk. The steps undertaken by Dodd-Frank are important first steps
in engaging the problem. But more could, and should, be done
A. Deferred Compensation
The Squam Lake Report, written by fifteen leading economists in response
to the emerging financial crisis, recommends deferring a significant
percentage of CEO compensation, in cash, for several years.198 Because the
compensation would be forfeited if the government had to provide capital
injections like those of TARP or other unusual guarantees of a firm's debt, it
would act as a form of insurance.199 These economists suggest that twenty
percent of an executive's compensation should be held back for five years,
and would ultimately be turned over to the executive only if the firm had
neither declared bankruptcy nor received extraordinary government support

194. Id.
195. See infra Part II.B.
196. See Walker, supra note 23 at 658 (noting that "enhanced disclosure is a double-edged
sword" that may lead to "less efficient, but more opaque compensation" and also to
"compensation ratcheting upwards as firms benchmark compensation against each
other").
197. See Core & Guay, supra note 18, at 21 n.6 (discussing the difficulty of enforcing claw-back
provisions).
198. See FRENCH ET AL., supra note 48, at 81-84.
199. Id. at 83.
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during that time. 200 The report advises that the deferred compensation should
not be accelerated for resignation, but it is silent about termination. 201
Something along these lines is already practiced by the Swiss bank, UBS,
which pays its executives' annual bonus into an escrow account, with payouts
restricted to a third of the bonus each year. 202 Bonuses are added yearly, and
the account balance is reduced if the business unit or the firm experiences a
loss. 203
This account is held for three years after the executive's
termination.204 Similarly, firms issuing stock options or restricted stock to
their top executives could do so with the provision of a pre-determined fixed
schedule for cashing out.205 The advantage here would be that removing
executives' control over the timing of equity sales discourages insider
manipulation. 206 The downside is that because deferred compensation
decreases the executive's liquidity and diversification, executive pay levels may
be forced upward. 207
B. Tax Reform
The abject failure of 5 162(m), as well as 5 280G's golden parachute
provisions, 208 to halt the ballooning of executive pay counsel against attacking
the problem of executive pay through corporate taxation strategies. Section
162(m), moreover, not only failed to curb excessive pay, but also created
perverse incentives by discouraging index options and restricted stock, while
encouraging nondiscretionary bonus formulas that encourage accounting
manipulation. 209
By all accounts, 5 162(m) has failed to link pay to performance. If it has
achieved neither of its objectives, neither limiting the rise of executive pay nor
linking pay to performance, why not repeal it? Congress should simply
abandon the deductibility limitations, and permit corporations to structure

200. Id. at 82-83.
201. Id. at 83.
202. Compensation Report: UBS's New Compensaion Model, UBS (Nov. 17, 2008),
http://www.ubs.com/compensationreport (summarizing UBS's compensation practices).
203. Id
204. Id
205. See Fried, sefra note 42, at 455 (suggesting that institutional investors should urge firms to
adopt a "hands-of?' policy with a fixed and gradual schedule of payouts).
206. Id.
207. See supra text accompanying note 175.
208. See supra note 191.
209. See Gregg D. Polsky, Controlling Executive Compensaton Through the Tax Code, 64 WASH. &
LEE L. Rrv. 877, 926 (2007) (noting "the perverse incentives" created by § 162(m)).
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their pay packages in whatever way makes most sense for the firm. This does
nothing to limit executive pay, but then, neither has § 162(m).
Alternatively, the tax code could be revised to prohibit corporate
deductions for the pay of a firm's top (say, five) executives. Deductions, after
all, are commonly described as a matter of "legislative grace." 210 The
reasoning that former President Clinton employed in justifying § 162(m) was
that "the tax code should no longer subsidize excessive pay of chief
executives and other high executives." 211 That rationale applies equally to
abandoning the deductions altogether.
One question is why corporations do not simply opt to forfeit the
deductions. The obvious reason is that the company's overall tax liability will
be greater, yet the amount at stake for the corporation will typically be too
small for the cap on deductions to have much effect. 212 Another reason may
be the SEC disclosure rules, which require disclosure of the impact of 5
162(m) on firm compensation policies. 213 Firms may fear shareholder outrage
if they disclose that they have decided not to utilize this deduction. This fear,
however, does not prevent nearly forty percent of firms from foregoing the
deduction altogether. 214
Even if this proposal was adopted, revoking the deductions for executive
pay only gets the federal government out of the business of structuring pay
packages. It does not address the problem of the increasing disparity in
income levels between the people at the top of the corporate hierarchy and
the other employees. The disclosure of the gap between pay levels required
by Dodd-Frank may help in this regard by shaming firms. However, it is
unlikely that this will have any more effect than the public outrage over
executive bonuses after the bailout. Rather than count on shaming to have an
effect, why not focus on taxing the individuals reaping the exorbitant
rewards? I am not suggesting a "CEO tax" similar to the one Britain levied

210. See David I. Walker, Suitablefor Framing: Business Deductions in a Net Income Thx System, 52
WM. & MARY L. Ruv. (forthcoming Mar. 2011), available at www.bu.edu.law/faculty/
scholarship/workingpapers/2010.html.
211. David E. Rosenbaum, Business Leaders Urged By Clinton to Back Tax Plan, N.Y. TiMEs, Feb.
12, 1993, at Al.
212. The average Fortune 500 firm pays its top executives around 1.8% of its profits, so the
actual effect of the deductibility cap is minimal. See Simmons, supra note 2, at 363.
213. Executive Compensation Disclosure; Securityholder Lists and Mailing Requests, Securities
Act Release No. 7032, 55 SEC Docket 1352, 1355 (Nov. 22, 1993) (requiring proxy
statement disclosure of "the registrant's policy with respect to qualifying compensation
paid to its executive officers for deductibility under Section 162(m)").
214. Balsam & Yin, supra note 174.
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on its bankers' bonuses,215 but a progressive tax. A progressive tax which
taxed a significantly higher percentage of income for those at the top two
percent of the wealth pyramid would at least stabilize the system. Rather than
attempting to curb pay levels indirectly through deduction caps, a progressive
income tax would do far more toward leveling the social inequality that is the
crux of the concern. Raising taxes is never a popular political option, but
such a tax would nevertheless be far more effective than capping pay or
capping deductions.
C. Get Serious About the Business Judgment Rule
Courts rarely overturn executive pay decisions, finding that complex
business decisions like executive pay are particularly unsuitable for judicial
review. 216 Courts protect boards' executive pay decisions through the
business judgment rule. 21 7 In order for the business judgment rule to apply,
however, the board must actually exercise its independent judgment and
adhere to processes that help assure that they have carefully considered the
matter carefully (e.g., employing independent consultants to advise the
board). 218 Yet, in the litigation surrounding the severance package paid to
Disney's former President, the courts recognized that the board was severely
dysfunctional, but opted to lecture the directors rather than find them
liable. 219
In the final opinion of the Disney case, the Delaware Supreme Court held
that the business judgment rule protected the board's decision to terminate

215. See generally Paul Wilmott, Gone with the Windfall, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 12, 2009, at WK10
(reporting on Britain's 50% windfall tax to be paid by banks on bankers' discretionary
bonuses above $40,000).
216. See, e.g., Exacto Spring Corp. v. Comm'r, 196 F.3d 833, 838 (7th Cir. 1999) (opining that
"judges are not competent to decide what business executives are worth"). Courts almost
never overturn executive pay decisions at publicly held companies. Linda J. Baris, The
Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to Controlling Executive Pay, 68 IND L.J. 59,
81-82 (1992) (collecting data).
217. For an explanation of the business judgment rule, see FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ,
CORPORATION LAW 286 (2d ed. 2010) ("The idea underlying the business judgment rule
is that courts should exercise restraint in holding directors liable for (or otherwise second
guessing) business decisions which produce poor results or with which reasonable minds
might disagree.").
218. See In re Viacom Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2891 at *22 (N.Y.
App. Div. June 23, 2006) (declining to dismiss on finding the independence of the
compensation committee questionable).
219. Brehm v. Eisney (In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.), 907 A.2d 693, 697 (Del. Ch.
2005), afd, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
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Disney's president, Michael Ovitz, without cause, 220 as well as the board's
initial approval of his pay package, which included severance provisions that
resulted in a $130 million payout for fourteen months of work. 22 1 Although
the court ultimately declined to hold the directors liable for breach of
fiduciary duties or corporate waste, it noted that the compensation committee
approved the terms of Ovitz's employment (including his pay package) after
deliberating only an hour, during which time it also considered four unrelated
matters. 222 Moreover, it was Michael Eisner, Disney's CEO, and a close
friend of Ovitz, who negotiated the terms of employment. The board did not
have the agreement or even complete information about the terms of the pay
package before them when they deliberated. 223 The compensation committee
nonetheless unanimously approved the general terms of the agreement. 224
Among the terms of the employment agreement was a severance provision
that provided that termination for any reason other than gross negligence or
malfeasance would result in substantial severance payments. 225 In a later
meeting, the compensation committee met to discuss issues relating to stock
options, and ratified the entire employment agreement.226
When it became apparent that Ovitz was not working out, it was Eisner
who made the decision to fire Ovitz without cause. 227 The Disney board
"had never met in order to vote on, or even discuss, the termination at a full
session, and few if any directors did an independent investigation of whether
Neither the Compensation
Ovitz could be terminated for cause." 228
Committee nor any other committee of the board met to vote on or discuss
whether Ovitz could be terminated for cause. 229

220.
221.
222.
223.

224.
225.

226.
227.
228.
229.

In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative UtiA., 906 A.2d at 70.
Id.at 73.
Id. at 40. See also In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d at 708.
Nor were all the terms of Ovitz's pay revealed to the members of the Compensation
Committee. Notably absent were the purchase of Ovitz's private jet for $187,000 over
the appraised value, the purchase of Ovitz's BMW at purchase price rather than
depreciation value, and any specific list of perquisites. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative it.,
907 A.2d at 709 n.85.
Id. at 708-09.
The no-fault termination payment would consist of Ovitz's remaining salary, $7.5 million
per year for un-accrued bonuses, immediate vesting of options, and a $10 million cash-out
payment. Id. at 709. As it turned out, Ovitz's termination cost Disney $130 million for
his fourteen months in office. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Itg., 906 A.2d at 35.
In re Waft Disney Co. Derivative Utig., 907 A.2d at 710.
Id.at 731
Id. at 736.
Id
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payments
as
described
the severance
Chancellor
Chandler
"breathtaking." 230 Indeed, he noted that "many lessons of what not to do can
be learned from defendants' conduct here." 231 He described the board as
"supine" and "passive,"232 and remarked on "Eisner's success at surrounding
himself with non-employee directors who would have sycophantic
tendencies." 233 Although the board's conduct "fell significantly short of the
best practices of ideal corporate governance," the lower court nevertheless
declined to abrogate the business judgment rule. 234
The lower court thus recognized directorial misconduct and structural
bias, yet nevertheless felt constrained to merely lecture on the
inappropriateness of the directors' conduct while absolving the directors of
liability for breach of duty of care, good faith, or corporate waste. On appeal,
the Supreme Court rested its conclusion on its analysis of whether the CEO
was permitted to terminate Ovitz without authorization of the board, and
focused this analysis on the firm's certificate of incorporation and by-laws. 235
The certificate provided that the company's officers "shall hold their offices
for such terms and shall carry out such duties as are determined solely by the
Board of Directors, subject to the right of the Board of Directors to remove
any officer or officers at any time with or without cause." 236 Because the
certificate does not repeat the term "solely" with respect to the board's
removal right, the court turned to the Disney by-laws. 237 After concluding
that the Disney by-laws were ambiguous, however, the court upheld the
chancellor's interpretation that the by-laws gave concurrent power to the
board and the CEO on the basis of extrinsic evidence that "the Board
unanimously believed that Eisner, as Chairman and CEO, possessed the
power to terminate Ovitz." 238
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

238.

Id. at 698.
Id. at 760.
Id. at 760 n.487.
board of directors with
Id. at 760, 760 n.488 (commenting that "Eisner stacked his
friends and other acquaintances").
Id. at 697.
In re Walt DisnyGCo. Derivative litg., 906 A.2d at 69-70.
Id. at 68.
Id. at 69. For an article castigating the court's analysis of Disney's governing documents,
see Marc I.Steinberg & Matthew D. Bivona, Disny Goes Goofy: Agen, Delegation, and
Corporate Governance, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 201, 208 (2008) (contending that "the court made a
fundamental flaw in its analysis" because, if the certificate vested exclusive removal power
in the board, the by-laws could not make it concurrent).
Inre Walt Disney Co. Derivative litig., 906 A.2d at 69. The Disney by-laws provided that the
Board Chairman/ CEO "shall, subject to the provisions of the Bylaws and the control of
the Board of Directors, have general and active management, direction, and supervision
over the business of the Corporation and over its Officers." Id. at 68. The court
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Even under the court's interpretation, however, concurrent power is not
unilateral power. 239 The board never met to discuss whether Ovitz could be
terminated for cause. The business judgment rule does not protect abdication
of directorial responsibilities. A more courageous court would have noted the
absence of procedures, the lack of independence, the utter failure to exercise
judgment, and held that the business judgment rule does not apply to these
circumstances. Without a considered business judgment, there is nothing
deserving of protection.
Corporations are supposed to be managed by the board of directors for a
reason. Theoretically, the group decision-making of the board, where there is
open group deliberation, where a range of alternatives is considered, and
competing ideas vetted, is superior to individual decision-making. If, instead
of engaging in informed, deliberative decision-making, the board simply
defers to the CEO, there is little reason to protect their decisions. Court
deference to such decisions is an unwarranted abdication of judicial decisionmaking. Absent a record of the deliberative process for a decision, the court
has no basis for invoking the rule's protection.
VI. CONCLUSION
The regulation of systemic risk is the centerpiece of the Dodd-Frank Act,
which imposes reforms on any firm deemed to be of systemic significance,
whether currently regulated as a bank, insurance company, or largely
unregulated, as long as its size, leverage and interconnectedness pose a threat
to financial stability should it fail. Its requirements that firms disclose the
relationship of pay to performance, CEO hedging activity, and the ratio
between CEO and median worker pay, demonstrate a salutary focus on the
acknowledged that this language neither vested power to terminate exclusively in the
board nor gave express concurrent power to both the board and the CEO. Id. at 69.
Thus, the Court found the by-laws ambiguous and therefore held that it was permissible
for the Chancellor to turn to extrinsic evidence in interpretation. Id
239. The Chancery Court commented that "a reasonably prudent CEO ... would not have
acted in as unilateral a manner as did Eisner when essentially committing the corporation
to hire a second-in-command, appoint that person to the board, and provide him with
one of the largest and richest employment contracts ever enjoyed by a non-CEO." In re
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Itzg., 907 A.2d at 761-62. Chancellor Chandler further
remarked that "[bly virtue of his Machiavellian (and imperial) nature as CEO, and his
control over Ovitz's hiring in particular, Eisner to a large extent is responsible for the
failings in process that infected and handicapped the board's decisionmaking abilities." Id.
at 760. Both courts nevertheless failed to recognize, however, that under its own
jurisprudence, a supine board is undeserving of business judgment rule protection.
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structure of pay packages in these firms. "Say on pay" votes may be largely
toothless, but they at least provide the directors with feedback on their pay
decisions.
At the same time, Dodd Frank's claw-back provisions, though more
enforceable than those of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, are not sufficiently
deterrent for executives willing to undertake excessive risk. Deferred
compensation would be a preferable option. Moreover, there are still
distorting influences left in place. At a minimum, 5 162(m)'s deduction for
stock option pay should be repealed. An even better route would be to
completely discontinue the government's subsidy of executive pay by
repealing the corporate deduction for the top few executives. If income
inequality is truly a concern, abandoning this subsidy and implementing a
progressive tax aimed at highly compensated executives would appear to be a
better redistribution solution. Finally, courts need to take the business
judgment rule seriously. Although courts cannot be expected to structure pay
packages for directors, they can examine the process by which decisions on
executive pay are made. A board's failure to engage in a process of informed
deliberation should not be protected by the courts.

